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MR. KEYTE:

Commissioner Ohlhausen has

agreed to give some remarks at lunch today and also
will be a keynote speaker on Friday.
will be some questions at the end.

For today, there

Maybe she’s

feeling that she might have a little more freedom
these days to say what’s on her mind.

You never know.

As everybody knows, Commissioner Ohlhausen
really has been holding, and has held, the Federal
Trade Commission together during some quite
interesting times and really, both analytically and in

Verbatim Transceedings, Inc.

2

terms of enforcement, kept the FTC on-track when they
were down to essentially two Commissioners.
The anecdote I have, however, which I think
is in some sense even more interesting, is one of
Commissioner Ohlhausen’s hobbies that I learned about
firsthand.

When I signed up to do skeet shooting at

one of these post-annual conferences, I thought: Okay,
well, that’ll be fun.
Commissioner.

You get to schmooze with the

Skeet shooting.

This should be

interesting.
Of course, I show up with eight other
people.

The Commissioner has her own gun, her own

case, her own stuff.
somebody.

I’m worried about killing

I think Maureen proceeded to hit twenty-

three of twenty-five while the rest of us were trying
to hit three and not kill each other.
She’s very tough in many respects.

She may

have — I just saw an announcement — just had a victory
like five minutes ago —
MS. OHLHAUSEN:
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MR. KEYTE:

— that she may want to talk

about.
We welcome you both for our practitioners’
lunch and for speaking on Friday as well.
MS. OHLHAUSEN:

Thank you.

Thank you, James, for that

very nice introduction, and I hope my record in court
is as good as my record on the skeet shooting range,
but we’ll see.
It’s always an honor to participate at the
annual Fordham event where international enforcers
from around the world share observations about their
competition policies and their regimes.
As many of you know, my term as an FTC
Commissioner draws to a close at the end of this
month.

It has been a wonderful experience, and I’m

very proud of my tenure at the FTC, but as the saying
goes, “All good things must come to an end.”
Which leads me to my topic today, which is
remedies and what we do at the end of a successful
competition case.
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discussion this morning of what are the appropriate
remedies, and I’ll expand a little bit on what was
said earlier.
There has been a lively discussion at the
Commission recently about a host of issues, including
remedies in both competition and consumer protection
cases.

Thus, I believe it’s a good time for me to

address several topics about competition remedies.
First, I’ll talk about the purpose of
remedies in a competition case; second, what we at the
FTC have learned about how merger remedies are
working; and third, how we’ve been applying that
knowledge.

Finally, I’ll mention a recent challenge

to our ability to get the remedy of injunctive relief
in federal court.
Taking on the first topic, the purpose of
remedies in a competition case necessarily requires an
understanding of the goals of competition law itself.
In the United States we believe — and I think the
courts have made clear — that the government’s role in
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competition enforcement is to safeguard and preserve
competition.

An important corollary to this

fundamental principle is that it is not the role of
antitrust to create or direct competition.
In practice, this means that competition
enforcers should not intervene simply because they
dislike certain market outcomes.

Antitrust is about

protecting the process, not guaranteeing a particular
result at a particular time.

Instead, we trust that

markets, in which firms must endure competitive
pressures, will produce favorable outcomes in terms of
price, output, quality, and innovation in the long
run.

But if prices seem excessive or output stagnant

at a point in time, we don’t use antitrust enforcement
to require firms to charge less or to produce more.
In short, antitrust is not regulation.
is because, as the Supreme Court observed in the
National Society of Professional Engineers case,
“Competition is the best method of allocating
resources in a free market, and even occasional
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exceptions to the presumed consequences of competition
are not grounds for antitrust enforcement.”
But this isn’t to denigrate competition
enforcement, which plays a vital role in overall
government efforts to provide a framework in which
competition can thrive.

Rather, this speaks to the

government’s appropriate task in competition
enforcement.

As Milton Friedman described: “The

purpose of government in a free economy is to do what
markets cannot do.

That is, serve as an umpire,

create money, build roads and parks.

The role of

government is not to dictate outcomes of the market
process.”1
I agree with that description of our role as
an umpire, making sure that competitors compete fairly
on the merits.

We shouldn’t dictate outcomes,

however, or pick the winner or loser of the game.

But

government should make sure that the sides are not
agreeing to shave points, prevent better players from

1

MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (1962).
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playing, or colluding to undermine the nature of the
contest.
If we agree, at least for now, that the role
of antitrust enforcement is to preserve competition
and not to create or direct it or pursue some other
goal than consumer welfare, then we have a starting
point from which the government can appropriately
begin to seek remedies.

Because merger remedies are

the most common form of competition remedies, I’ll
start with those.
I’ve long called for transparency and
predictability and fairness in competition
enforcement.

What these principles mean in the

context of merger remedies is that the parties and the
public should know among other things what remedies
the FTC is likely to seek to mitigate potential harm
to competition from a combination of particular firms.
As this audience knows — and I think it was
referenced earlier today — in the last few years there
has been a robust academic debate about the efficacy
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of merger remedies, which previous FTC chairs have
addressed at this very conference.

In fact, the most

recent issue of the Antitrust Law Journal includes the
latest chapter of that discussion authored by two FTC
economists, which I commend to all of you.
Although I acknowledge this larger debate,
what I’d like to talk about today is what the agency
has been doing to address such concerns regardless of
their actual magnitude.
As one of my first actions as Acting
Chairman, early last year I announced the release of
the FTC’s 2017 Merger Remedies Report.

In building on

the FTC’s 1999 Divestiture Study, the 2017 Report
provides the latest insight into the efficacy of the
Commission’s merger remedies.

In preparing this

Report, staff reviewed all of its remedial orders
between 2006 and 2012, eighty-nine orders in all,
variously using a case study method, questionnaires,
and data.
The conclusions are heartening because they
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suggest that the FTC’s remedies work well in most
cases, and the conclusions were useful because they
identify imperfections that the Commission and its
staff have not only begun addressing but are
implementing in reaching merger consent orders today.
An important highlight of the Report’s
findings is that while over 80 percent of the FTC’s
remedies succeeded, all of the consents containing
fix-it-first structural divestitures of ongoing
businesses successfully maintain competition.

By

comparison, divesting partial assets and hold-separate
agreements were not always effective remedies.
Sometimes the divested partial assets were not as
competitively robust as anticipated.

When competitive

businesses were maintained by neutral third parties
under hold-separate agreements, those businesses
sometimes missed opportunities that would have made
the divested asset more competitive.
FTC staff is already moving forward on
improving those outcomes.
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more fix-it-first divestitures, but as current Bureau
of Competition (BC) Director Bruce Hoffman explained
recently, “Going forward, the Agency will negotiate
consents to ensure that the risk of failure be placed
on the parties to the merger and not the FTC.”
Indeed, this is already evident in some recent orders.
For example, the CRH acquisition of Ash
Grove involved products of cement and aggregates —
always a popular antitrust topic — such as crushed
stone, gravel, sand, and similar products with
operations throughout the United States.

There are

many competitors nationwide, but distribution of these
products tends to be regional — they are heavy
products — and so geographic markets tend to be
smaller.
In this case there were potentially
anticompetitive overlaps in Montana; Omaha, Nebraska;
and eastern Kansas.

As one would expect, the FTC

ordered divestitures of the complete ongoing
businesses’ operations in these three markets to
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competitors around the industry.

These buyers were

ready to move into the ongoing operations quickly with
minimal competitive disruption.

But to shift the risk

and preserve competition in Montana the order also
guaranteed that CRH provide the buyer of the Montana
assets access to certain CRH rail terminals to ensure
they would be able to compete on an equal footing with
the incumbent and that there wouldn’t be any
disruption in distribution.
The 2017 Remedy Study was also useful in
formulating the order in Grifols’s acquisition of
Biotest.

This merger involved blood plasma collection

centers throughout the United States and it raised
competitive concerns in three markets.

The order

required that the parties sell the full business
operations in those three markets to a buyer that
already competed in other markets.

But to maintain

the competitive status quo better and shift the risks,
the order also required the parties to give all
potentially affected employees at the divested assets
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sufficient financial incentives to stay with the
divested assets, and this helped ensure that
competition would be preserved in those three markets.
The cases I’ve discussed so far have
involved horizontal mergers.

Vertical merger

challenges are less frequent, though certainly not
rare, and vertical merger review is a meaningful part
of FTC merger enforcement.

In fact, since the year

2000 the FTC and Department of Justice have challenged
twenty-two vertical mergers, which is about one per
year.
That being said, vertical merger enforcement
is still a small part of our merger workload, and I
think this likely reflects the overall broad consensus
in competition policy and economic theory that the
majority of vertical mergers are beneficial because
they reduce costs and increase interbrand competition.
But this doesn’t mean that all vertical
mergers are benign, however, and we have challenged
vertical mergers on grounds such as a reduction in the
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likelihood of beneficial entry, anticompetitive
foreclosure, or anticompetitive behavior due to
information sharing about a rival.

For cases where

the vertical merger would benefit consumers as long as
the anticompetitive effects were mitigated, the FTC
has successfully developed remedies to prevent harm.
I’d like to stress that the FTC prefers
structural remedies even with vertical mergers, but in
some cases we believe that a behavioral or conduct
remedy can prevent competitive harm while still
allowing the benefits of integration to occur.

For

example, in our experience firewalls can prevent
information sharing, and nondiscrimination clauses can
eliminate incentives to disfavor rivals.
Notably, the 2017 Merger Study included four
orders related to vertical mergers, and each one
succeeded in maintaining competition at premerger
levels.

Although it’s a small sample, it does suggest

we have the expertise and experience to fashion
conduct remedies in vertical mergers that control
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opportunities and incentives for anticompetitive
behavior.
Our most recent example of a vertical merger
remedy involved the tie-up of Northrop and Orbital
ATK.

Defense contractor Northrop sought to acquire

Orbital ATK, which manufactures solid rocket motors.
There was no horizontal product overlap.

However,

Orbital ATK sells solid rocket motors to Northrop and
its rivals, who sell them with other products to the
Department of Defense.

Northrop also purchases solid

rocket motors from Orbital ATK and other competitors.
When FTC staff investigated the merger, they
learned that both Northrop’s and Orbital ATK’s
competitors were concerned that the merged company
would share competitively sensitive information about
each other’s rivals and gain an unfair advantage in
both markets.
To prevent the potential competitive harm
from arising we crafted an order requiring the parties
to create a firewall that will prohibit Northrop and
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Orbital ATK, those units now owned by the same
company, from sharing data with each other.

To better

guarantee compliance, the order also allows the
Department of Defense to appoint a monitor to confirm
compliance with these restrictions, and the Department
of Defense was the real purchaser for most of these
systems.
Turning to conduct remedies, the debate here
often is about how far the agency should go to restore
market competition and deter future anticompetitive
conduct.

That’s why it’s important — indeed critical

— to remember that the role of the FTC is to restore
markets to their competitive states and prevent future
anticompetitive conduct, not to restructure markets or
businesses to regulators’ preferences divorced from
any underlying violation.
A good example of a typical conduct remedy
is the order issued in the recent Your Therapy Source
matter.

This case involved an agreement between two

parties and then a wider invitation to collude in the
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home therapist staffing market in the Dallas/Fort
Worth area.
Home therapist staffing companies outsource
therapist staffing to independent contractors, and the
complaint alleged that one staffing company sought an
agreement among competitors to place a ceiling on the
wages paid to independent contractors.

There was

strong evidence that the respondent made an invitation
to collude but that except for one competitor there
was no evidence that other recipients acted on that
invitation.
In cases like this, where the FTC catches
the conduct in its incipiency, an order is still
needed to prevent any future collusion, and thus our
order required the parties to cease and desist from
further inappropriate communications among
competitors.
The need to prevent a recurrence of
anticompetitive conduct brings me to an issue
involving our remedial authority.
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appeal before the Third Circuit in the ViroPharma
litigation.

Our complaint in federal court alleged

the defendant engaged in repetitive sham petitioning
before the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to
include a generic competitor to its branded product,
and we sought to permanently enjoin ViroPharma from
using similar methods to exclude generic competition
in its other branded products.
The district court dismissed the complaint
on what it believed were novel grounds, holding that
Section 13(b) of the FTC Act allows injunctive relief
“only if the Commission can prove that the defendant
is imminently about to violate the FTC Act.”

Because

ViroPharma’s efforts to forestall generic competition
for the particular product at issue ceased when the
FDA finally dismissed ViroPharma’s baseless petitions
and the FDA then allowed the generics to enter, the
district court found that ViroPharma was not about to
violate the law, and therefore the Commission could
not state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
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The imminent standard applied by the
district court risks radically altering the
Commission’s ability to challenge any competitive
conduct in federal court.

Section 13(b) is, at least

today, the primary remedial tool the Commission uses
when it litigates a conduct matter in federal court.
By significantly narrowing its scope, the district
court decision risks giving serial offenders a free
pass and creates an almost impossible timing
requirement for the Commission.
Speaking solely for myself, I’m hopeful that
the Third Circuit will reverse the lower court, given
that its decision is at odds with the standard applied
in many other circuits, including the D.C. Circuit.
I’ll close by reiterating that predicting
competitive outcomes and finding the right enforcement
remedies requires a clear understanding of the goals
of antitrust law and careful analytical work.

Every

market is different, and each case presents its unique
facts.

We should, however, still strive to carry out
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this important work in a way that provides
predictability, transparency, and fairness to parties
and the public.
Thank you for your attention, and I’d be
happy to take some questions.
James.
MR. KEYTE:

Maureen, in terms of remedies,

how has the FTC dealt with international cooperation
for multijurisdictional protection?
MS. OHLHAUSEN:

In my experience, we’ve been

able for the most part to handle that pretty well.
For example, a few years ago there was a music merger.
We reviewed it in the United States, they reviewed it
in Europe, and we found that though there were
problems the European remedy really took care of it,
so we were happy with that.
Certainly that is not always the case.
Sometimes we have seen cases where we thought a remedy
was sufficient and other regimes around the world may
have wanted something different.
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some concerns about extraterritorial reach of some
remedies or some of the hold-separate agreements for
an indeterminate amount of time, remedies that we’ve
seen some other enforcers impose.
But I think for many cases we really do try
to strive to have a consistent remedy.

Going back to

some of the cement cases, we’ve had some. I think the
Canadian remedy and the U.S. remedy really meshed
together quite well.

It’s for the most part working

okay, but every once in a while.
MR. KEYTE:

Any other questions?

MS. OHLHAUSEN:

Another question?

[No response]
MR. KEYTE:

All right.

Well, thank you,

Maureen, and good luck with your judgeship, which we
know will eventually happen.
MS. OHLHAUSEN:

Thank you so much, everyone.

[Break: 1:36 p.m.]
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